erent. But more important than that, it makes a specific and ''untimely'' demand (in Nietzsche's sense) for a recalibration of theoretical inquiry into the conditions of textual consumption and a balancing out of the usual emphasis given to production. It is along these lines that it has been adopted to good effect by Fredric Jameson, among others, in an effort to rethink a subject and topic which-owing to the enormous emotional and intellectual investments made in it-are only too liable to produce (as is any important orthodoxy) willful stupidities and petty obstinacies, namely, Marxism. Jameson suggests that if we accustom ourselves to thinking of philosophical arguments and claims as specific desires rather than determinate stances, ''we will be better able to bracket the content of such positions provisionally and to turn to the more historically interesting question of why intellectual or social strata in contemporary society'' have found it necessary or useful to elaborate such a doxa in the first place. 2 And although the reception of Michel de Certeau's work is arguably approaching the point when one would want to make a similarly exasperated intervention as Lyotard's, that is not going to be my strategy here. 3 Instead, what I want to show-while also arguing for the need to interpret Certeau ''in the plural''-is that in his writings (from the earliest to the latest) a reading strategy similar in spirit to the one advocated by Lyotard is deployed by Certeau, inasmuch as a new type of rapprochement between the conditions of consumption and production is forged. Although the issue for Certeau was not Marxism but the historically prior problem of orthodoxy in the Christian Church, his solution took the form of an unrelieved contradiction similar to Lyotard's contradiction between Marx as a bearded sage and Marx as a little girl. Orthodoxy, Certeau argued, is a defense mechanism against the threatened fragmentations of pluralism; although its putative aim is to protect unity, it actually destroys it. Any admission of heterodoxy always carries the risk of heterogeneity, and that is something no Christianthinking scholar can freely tolerate. ''No one could call himself [sic] Christian if this term only had meanings which were unrelated to one another. All Christianity would be an illusion if it were unsuccessful in showing forth effective continuity and unity.'' 4 Yet if one is unable to think the unorthodox at all-that is to say, the absolute negative of unity-then one cannot properly think unity either. In a maneuver made famous by Derrida, Certeau therefore concludes that the unresolved tension between the orthodox and the unorthodox is in fact the condition of possibility for unity; thus to relieve the tension between them is to negate them both.
Unity is not a given, Certeau argued, but an ongoing process-indeed, a revolutionary task. 5 ''The temptation is to accept fixation. Where God appears to be demanding revolutionary change, the devil always comes down on the side of the status quo.'' 6 The actual labor demanded of anyone who would seek to follow the precepts of the desire named pluralism can best be described-borrowing from Jameson-as language experiment. 7 Importantly, Certeau refused to allow that unity could only be an ineffable something toward which one merely gestured-in the manner of modernist art, say-gesturing toward the sublime while knowing full well that such an attempt was bound to fail to reach its mark and thereby making virtues of its admirable failures. 8 For Certeau, the language of unity could not be other than historical, and those who would endeavor to produce it must do so with the language resources at hand. Artistic innovation, then, had to take the form of a creative ''re-employment'' or ''alteration.'' 9 Hence the need for language experiments such as those conducted by the seventeenth-century mystics who, via the self-imposition of a host of textual constraints, found the means of using ordinary discourse to evoke the extraordinary and divine, thereby restoring (albeit for a limited time) unity in the face of proliferating pluralisms. 10
However, the historicism runs deeper than that, since it is not only the linguistic resources deployed by the mystics which are historical in character; so too are their artistic productions and indeed their entire way of living. Every spiritual movement, according to Certeau, is essentially historical in character because its primary tasks are related to the description and codification of the inherent practical difficulties of actually ''living'' a religion. Consequently, its principal discursive efforts will be aimed less at elaborating a particular theory than at demonstrating as pragmatically as possible within the constraints of the religious doctrine how one can (as well as should, of course) live in dependence on the Absolute, given the specific conditions of a particular cultural situation. The function of such discourse is ideological in the positive sense of sustaining and validating a certain way of life. Unsurprisingly, its expression tends to be made ''in terms of the experiences, ambitions, fears, sicknesses and greatnesses proper to the men [sic] who are caught up with contemporaries in a world conditioned by a particular kind of exchange and a particular type of consciousness.'' 11 The trouble is, though, that the nearer its expressions are to the cutting edge of the historical, the further they risk being from unity itself.
That said, it is the sheer fact of being able to read mystical discourse as historically conditioned (from the distant perspective of the twentieth century and from within the confines of religious history) that defines the true nature of Certeau's achievement. He had to find the means of reclaiming mystical language from the impenetrable depths of the various no-wheres and no-whens of madness, heresy, and ineffability to which it had been consigned by religious historians, unwilling or unable to read the texts for themselves and in their own terms, while at the same time explaining how it was that the very hermeneutic key he ultimately had to argue exists came to be so irrevocably lost in the first place. To do that he had to interrogate the multiply overdetermined desire to keep mystical discourse in its place of darkness. What he found, remarkably enough, was that its obscurity is a consequence not of conspiracy or suppression, but of its own strategy of closing off and shutting down avenues of interpretation. 12 Ultimately exhausting the discursive possibilities of their strategies, the mystics were compelled to seek a new means of evoking God's mournful absence. This presents historians with a seemingly insurmountable problem: because the succeeding modes (especially those of our own time) offer no resources by which to read these past texts, the discontinuity is almost absolute. Certeau's solution was to see spiritual discourse as an ongoing accommodation to and working out of a singular problem whose formal demands changed with the times; that problem could be written as a desire for a colloquy with the Other (pluralism). ''The problem is on each occasion defined by a cultural dialectic-the problem that the 'spiritual' man will see as that of his union with God.'' 13 His solution did not, however, amount to postulating some ineffable being or other ''that could be fashioned to fit any end, a 'night in which all cows are black.' '' 14 In fact, it was by focusing strictly on the desire of the mystics that the question of the animating force of the texts could be kept a purely formal matter of semiotics and not beome a theological issue of determining divine presence. Even so, as Certeau would remind us, to posit an other outside the text-organizing it without being present in it-is already to exorcize it; moreover, any such maneuver risks turning the other into a fetishized ''lack.'' ''It is preferable, therefore, to keep provisionally to what takes place in these texts whose status is indicated by the word 'mystic,' without forming in advance a definition (ideological or imaginary) of what a scriptural elaboration may have inscribed there.'' 15
Certeau's reading strategy, which we see at its most refined in relation to mystical discourse but which can also be seen in full flight in the earlier work on history and anthropology, attempts to elucidate the formal rules for producing as well as reading the texts. ''From this angle, the problem is not to find out if an exegetic treatise by Gregory of Nyssa is based on the same experience as a discourse later called 'mystic' [adj. mystique], nor if they are both constructed upon partially analogous rhetorical devices, but to determine what occurs in a field delimited by a name ('mystics' [n. mystique]) and within which work is being done in obedience to a relevant set of rules.'' 16 Such a method amounts to interpreting discourse in a musical sense, according to Certeau, because even while preserving and respecting the irreducible gap between ourselves and the distant moment of the production of the text, it nevertheless constitutes an ''attempt to execute its movement for ourselves, to retrace the steps of a labor but from afar, without taking as an object of knowledge that thing which, in passing, changed the written word into a hieroglyphic.'' 17 I want to call this strategy ''reading in the plural'' because it evokes the moment of the production of the text but does not then cancel it out by pretending that reading the text is a form of overwriting which raises consumption to a higher power. Instead, it attempts to analyze the nature of the relation between the two moments.
This special issue of SAQ has been put together with precisely this notion of interpreting ''in the plural'' in mind. If Certeau's music analogy can be extended to cover all types of exegetical work and not merely the interpretation of lost mystical doctrines, then it might perhaps be taken as an apt description of the way the articles in this collection are constituted. Here, too, one finds a series of attempts to execute the movement of another's thought, for fresh purposes. It is the continuing efficacy of Certeau's work that is emphasized by this means, albeit (perhaps even fortunately) at the price of overturning certain received readings.
Setting the tone for all that follows, John Frow's urgent and poignant ''Discursive Justice'' opens the collection by using Certeau's work to explore and problematize a range of issues arising in the wake of the so-called Stolen Generations report. The findings of an Australian government inquiry into the policy (enforced until quite recently) of abducting aboriginal children and placing them with white families, ostensibly to give them a better chance in life by removing them from the twin hazards of poverty and primitiveness, this report set a precedent for government documents in which the pained stories of victims are incorporated-and not merely as testimonial evidence of the wrongs committed against them but also as a selfconscious attempt to avoid speaking for those others. In so doing, the report provoked a public furor, forcing a willfully ignorant populace to engage with the hurt of people shamefully wronged by denying them the sterile safety of statistics. The author of Bringing Them Home, Ronald Wilson, a highly respected Australian judge and former chancellor of Murdoch University, was hardly thanked for that; indeed, his very style of reportage came under intense scrutiny and was used as a weapon against him and the findings of the report itself in an effort to contain its political ramifications. The hysteria of the moment made it clear that in Australia heterological writing-that which names the Other but does not let it speak-is the preferred mode, effectively acknowledging that pluralism will be tolerated only in name.
Lest Certeau be heroized by this case study, however, Carla Freccero comes forward to remind us that even the most avowedly pluralist thinkers have their unexamined presuppositions. In ''Toward a Psychoanalytics of Historiography,'' she questions the heteronormative bias of Certeau's work, thereby furthering several critiques initiated by feminist scholars. Taking a contrary but by no means uncritical line, Catherine Driscoll and MarieClaire Vallois discover in Certeau's work new resources for feminist engagement with the world-historical. So too do Verena Conley and Claire Colebrook, the former in the problematic context of the cultural significance of new technology, and the latter in terms of the ambivalent conjunction of Certeau's work with Foucault's. Jeremy Ahearne's ''Questions of Cultural Policy in the Thought of Michel de Certeau,'' extending this line of inquiry into a more generalized examination of Certeau's historiography, is complemented by Richard Terdiman's analysis of its central theoretical premises, particularly its (too little discussed) Hegelian influences and impulses, in ''The Marginality of Michel de Certeau.'' Meanwhile, Graham Ward and Frederick Bauerschmidt seek to connect Certeau's late (and much better known) secular works with his early religious writings, which, for one reason or another, have remained obscure to cultural studies, in order to show that one cannot fully understand Certeau unless his work is-to borrow a phrase from Deleuze-''taken as a whole.'' Tom Conley and Timothy Tomasik take this issue to an even more fundamental level by scrutinizing the basic and practically unresolvable editorial and linguistic complexities of translating Certeau into English. Here one learns of the cost-in every sense of the word-of rendering Certeau in the plural. This collection is like a constellation, with every article a glittering star in its own right but the full effect of which is to be appreciated only when all are taken together (''as a whole'').
Notes
According to Luce Giard, Certeau joined the Jesuit order in hopes of going to China. World events conspired against him, but, in one of those twists of fate and circumstance that I am sure Certeau himself would have appreciated, this special issue of SAQ was in fact conceived and constructed during the two visits to China I was fortunate enough to make in  and . I would like to take this opportunity, then, of thanking my hosts, Wang 
